

(Continued)

distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.

Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,—is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security? Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.

The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must

secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.

In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a

republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists.

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Source: Thomas, The Library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_10.html.

Consider the source and the audience: The *Federalist Papers* were anonymous editorials, written to persuade the citizens of New York to sign on to the Constitution. *Federalist* No. 10 was especially aimed at people who feared the possibilities for corruption in a large country. How is Madison responding to those fears?

Lay out the argument, the values, and the assumptions: How does Madison define factions and why are they problematic? Why does he think the root causes of factions cannot be controlled, but the effects of factions can? How will the new republic do that?

Uncover the evidence: Does Madison provide any evidence to support his arguments? Is there any other type of evidence he could have added to make his argument more persuasive?

Evaluate the conclusion: Was Madison right? Are factions the source of instability in American politics? Can they be contained?

Sort out the political implications: What would Madison say if he could come back today? Would he think his expectations in *Federalist* No. 10 had been borne out? Would his argument change in the altered technological environment of today?